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On October 14, 1995, Phillip Lacoste was driving his car with his wife 
and two children down Old Gentilly Road in New Orleans when a truck 
traveling in the opposite direction attempted to turn and instead struck 
Lacoste’s vehicle.1 Barry Crochet was driving the truck, smelling of 
alcohol and visibly intoxicated.2 Crochet told Lacoste that he was working 
and that he would not wait for the police to arrive because police had 
previously cited him for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).3 The question 
the court had to answer was whether Crochet’s employer, Kelley 
Completion Services, was vicariously liable for any punitive damages the 
tortfeasor owed to the Lacoste family.4 
In 2015, the same issue of vicarious liability for punitive damages 
arose from a starkly different situation.5 Steven and Leslie Gillespie sued 
the School Board in which their young daughter was a student.6 The 
Gillespie’s daughter had sexual encounters with her teacher, Lance 
Duhon.7 Duhon had a questionable past, yet the School Board still 
employed him in a position of authority over young children.8 The court 
in Gillespie had to determine whether the School Board was vicariously 
liable for the punitive damages Duhon owed to the Gillespie family.9 
Both the Lacoste and Gillespie courts decided the issue of vicarious 
liability for punitive damages, but both decisions seem incompatible with 
the facts.10 In Lacoste, the court held an employer, who did not appear to 
be at fault, vicariously liable for punitive damages.11 In Gillespie, 
however, another court did not hold an employer who exercised poor 
judgment vicariously liable for punitive damages.12 These two cases 
highlight the circuit split between Louisiana appellate courts as to whether 
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 1. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 1000–01 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See generally Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 179 So. 3d 966 (La. 
Ct. App. 2015), writ denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016). 
 6. Id. at 970. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. Duhon had been previously investigated for sexual misconduct with a 
student. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). But see Gillespie, 
179 So. 3d 966. 
 11. See generally Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998.  
 12. See generally Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966. 




a court may hold an employer vicariously liable for compensatory 
damages and punitive damages arising from the same incident.13 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court has not expressed its view on the issue,14 and 
the laws that separately provide for vicarious liability and punitive 
damages make no mention of one another, resulting in ambiguity as to 
whether an employer can be vicariously liable for punitive damages.15 
Despite the circuit split, however, several Louisiana appellate courts and 
federal district courts have found employers not vicariously liable for 
punitive damages.16  
The current circuit split creates ambiguity in the law, causing 
confusion for both individuals and employers questioning potential rights 
or liability.17 To remedy this ambiguity, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
should clarify the issue of vicarious liability for punitive damages but 
continue to adhere to the traditional civilian viewpoint that disfavors 
punitive damages.18 The Louisiana Supreme Court should find that 
Louisiana courts generally cannot hold employers vicariously liable for 
punitive damages. In certain scenarios in which the employer is especially 
complicit in the injury-causing activity, however, it would be appropriate 
                                                                                                             
 13. See discussion infra Part II.  
 14. Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 718 n.6 (La. 2001). 
 15. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2019) (making no mention of punitive 
damages); see also id. art. 2315.4 (making no mention of vicarious liability).  
 16. See, e.g., Smith v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 95-3004, 1996 WL 537746 
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1996); see also Romero v. Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d 789 
(La. Ct. App. 2010), writ denied, 62 So. 3d 96 (La. 2011) (Third Circuit finding 
no vicarious liability for punitive damages); Lankford v. Nat’l Carriers Inc., No. 
12-01280, 2015 WL 518736 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015); Phelps v. Daimler Trucks 
N. Am., LLC, No. 13-6685, 2015 WL 12564180 (E.D. La. June 26, 2015); 
Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 970 (Third Circuit finding no vicarious liability for 
punitive damages). But see Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822, 826 (La. Ct. App. 
1999), writ denied sub nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748 So. 2d 441 (La. 1999) (Fourth 
Circuit finding the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages); see also 
Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153, 159 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Fifth 
Circuit assessing punitive damages against the employer, but not addressing the 
issue directly since the employer stipulated vicarious liability for all damages). 
 17. See Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). But see 
Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966. 
 18. John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive 
Damages - A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010) (“The 
prevailing and longstanding rule in modern civil law is that punitive damages 
violate the purpose behind the law of damages, which is to ‘repair the harm 
sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrongdoer.’”). 




for employers to be vicariously liable for both the compensatory and 
punitive damages assessed as a result of the employee’s direct actions.  
Part I of this Comment generally discusses punitive damages and 
vicarious liability in Louisiana. Part II demonstrates the nature of the 
circuit split and the confusion surrounding the issue of vicarious liability 
for punitive damages. Part III of this Comment explores the potential 
solutions that the Louisiana Supreme Court could implement to address 
the issue of vicarious liability for punitive damages. Part IV lays out a clear 
direction for the Court to take when making its decision and defines an 
approach that would typically find employers not vicariously liable for 
punitive damages, but reserves a more nuanced analysis for particularly 
culpable employers. 
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AS LAGNIAPPE LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA 
In actions arising from tortious conduct, damages can be divided by 
purpose:19 (1) to give compensation; and (2) to punish wrongdoers and 
deter wrongful conduct.20 Courts award compensatory damages to 
compensate and restore a person to the financial position that he “would 
have occupied had no tort been committed.”21 Punitive damages,22 by 
contrast, are designed to “punish the person doing the wrongful act” and 
to prevent similar conduct in the future.23  
A. The Restrictive Nature of Punitive Damages in Louisiana 
Louisiana statutory and codal authorities that allow recovery of 
punitive damages share the goal of deterrence.24 Punitive damages are a 
“supra-compensatory remedy,” meaning that courts award them in 
                                                                                                             
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 20. Id. See also id. § 901 cmt. a (“[T]he law of torts attempts primarily to put 
an injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior 
to the tort.”). See also id. § 901 cmt. c (“Finally, unlike the law of contracts or of 
restitution, the law of torts, which was once scarcely separable from the criminal 
law, has within it elements of punishment or deterrence. In certain types of cases 
punitive damages can be awarded . . . .”).  
 21. Id. § 903 cmt. a. 
 22. Punitive damages are also known as exemplary damages, as they mean to 
make an example of the culpable party. Id. § 908 cmt. a. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Bourque v. Bailey, 643 So. 2d 236, 23839 (La. Ct. App. 1994), 
writ denied, 648 So. 2d 392 (La. 1994). 




addition to compensatory damages.25 Although most states allow for 
punitive damages in situations involving malice or recklessness,26 other 
states restrict punitive damages to specific and narrow circumstances.27 
Louisiana falls into the latter category, allowing for punitive damages only 
in the narrowest of circumstances.28 Louisiana law allows an award of 
punitive damages expressly authorized by statute.29 Moreover, when 
awarding punitive damages in Louisiana, courts must narrowly construe 
statutes providing for punitive damages.30 
In Louisiana, courts may assess punitive damages against a defendant 
only when a statute so authorizes,31 such as when a defendant does any of 
the following: (1) causes damage to another as a result of his intoxication 
while operating a motor vehicle;32 (2) causes damage to another as a result 
of criminal sexual activity when the victim was seventeen years old or 
younger;33 (3) “intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to 
intercept, disclose, or use [the] communications” of another;34 (4) sells, 
                                                                                                             
 25. Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, 
Empirics, and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 
486 (Jennifer Allen ed., 2013).  
 26. See CHAD MARCHAND & MEADE MITCHELL, DAMAGES: A STATE BY 
STATE SUMMARY 158 (2014). For example, Michigan does not allow for the 
recovery of punitive damages to punish defendants but does allow exemplary 
damages in certain scenarios. See also Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 
N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (“An award of exemplary damages is considered proper if it 
compensates a plaintiff for the ‘humiliation, sense of outrage, and indignity’ 
resulting from injuries ‘maliciously, wilfully [sic] and wantonly’ inflicted by the 
defendant.”). 
 27. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (2018) (“No punitive damages 
shall be awarded in any action, unless otherwise provided by statute.”); Boott 
Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 106 N.E. 680, 683–84 (1914) (“It is only by express 
statute that [punitive] damages may be awarded.”); McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 
143 So. 383, 38586 (La. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932) (“There is no 
authority in the law of Louisiana for allowing punitive damages in any case, 
unless it be for some particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes the 
imposition of some such penalty.”). 
 28. See McCoy, 143 So. at 38586, 
 29. See id. See also, e.g., Bailey, 643 So. 2d at 238. 
 30. See McCoy, 143 So. at 38586; Bailey, 643 So. 2d at 238. 
 31. See McCoy, 143 So. at 38586; Bailey, 643 So. 2d at 238. See also LA. 
CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019); id. art. 2315.7; id. art. 2315.3; LA. REV. STAT. § 
15:1312 (2019); id. § 9:2800.76. 
 32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4. 
 33. Id. art. 2315.7. 
 34. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:1312. 




distributes, or “participate[s] in the marketing of an illegal controlled 
substance . . . in wanton or reckless disregard for the rights, health, and safety 
of others”;35 (5) causes injuries to another through an act involving juvenile 
pornography;36 or (6) causes death “by a wanton and reckless disregard for 
the rights and safety of the victim through an act of hazing . . . .”37  
Louisiana law also offers recovery through statutes that provide double 
or treble damages beyond the actual loss sustained.38 As double and treble 
damage statutes provide damages greater than mere compensation, double 
or treble damage statutes may be punitive in nature39 but are not a “supra-
compensatory remedy” like standard punitive damages.40 Because double 
or treble damage statutes are not a “supra-compensatory remedy,”41 one 
should not consider double or treble damage statutes traditional sources of 
punitive damages.  
Louisiana’s hesitance to embrace punitive damages is apparent in the 
discretionary nature of awarding punitive damages.42 Even if the plaintiff 
proves all of the elements of a statute providing punitive damages, the trier 
of fact has complete discretion in awarding punitive damages.43 Louisiana’s 
restriction of punitive damages also reflects civil law jurisdictions’ general 
disfavor of punitive damages.44 “[T]he prevailing and longstanding rule in 
modern civil law is that punitive damages violate the purpose behind the law 
of damages,” which is not to punish the wrongdoer, but merely to repair the 
damage caused to the victim.45 Continental European countries with civilian 
legal traditions generally reject punitive damages as a source of recovery.46 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. § 9:2800.76. 
 36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3. 
 37.  Id. art. 2315.10. 
 38. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 3:4278.1 (providing damages for landowners 
whose trees were intentionally cut down in the amount of three times market price).  
 39. Id. 
 40. Sharkey, supra note 25, at 486.  
 41. Id. 
 42. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 18, at 596 (discussing that 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 allows punitive damages to be awarded but at 
the discretion of the trier of fact); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (providing that 
punitive damages may be awarded); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.76 (providing that 
punitive damages may be awarded); but see id. § 15:1312 (providing that plaintiffs 
under this statute are entitled to recover, among other things, punitive damages). 
 43. See supra note 42.  
 44. deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 18, at 580. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages-A European Perspective, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 741, 750 (2008) (“The Principles of the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code, the Swiss and the Austrian draft, also do not accept punitive damages.”); 




Article 10:101 of the Principles of European Tort Law states: “Damages 
are a money payment to compensate the victim, that is to say, to restore 
him, so far as money can, to the position he would have been if the wrong 
complained of had not been committed.”47 Further, the European Group 
on Tort Law rejects punitive damages because they disproportionately 
reward the injured compared to his loss.48 Indeed, the civilian tradition’s 
disfavor of punitive damages is so strong that European rulings have even 
influenced the United States Supreme Court to restrict punitive damages 
domestically.49  
B. Louisiana Vicarious Liability Under Article 2320 
The doctrine of vicarious liability allows courts to hold parties 
responsible for the acts of third parties over whom they possess a certain 
level of authority.50 Vicarious liability often arises under the theory of 
respondeat superior, that is, an employer–employee relationship.51 An 
employer may be responsible for the acts of his employees because an 
employer acts through its principals and employees.52 Respondeat superior 
liability attaches to the employer when the employee breaches a duty to a 
third party while acting in the course and scope of his employment.53 
                                                                                                             
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 823, translation at https:// 
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p0027 [https://perm 
a.cc/3QAB-VLNL] (“A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures 
the life, body, health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable 
to make compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this.”). 
 47. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: 
TEXT AND COMMENTARY 8 (Springer-Verlag/Wien 2005). 
 48. Id. at 15051. 
 49. Michael L. Wells, A Common Lawyer’s Perspective on the European 
Perspective on Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 557, 559 (2010). See, e.g., Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (“[T]his Court has found that 
the Constitution imposes certain limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding 
punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as ‘grossly excessive.’”); State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408–09 (2003) (“Compensatory 
damages are intended to redress a plaintiff’s concrete loss, while punitive damages 
are aimed at the different purposes of deterrence and retribution. The Due Process 
Clause prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a 
tortfeasor.”). 
 50. RICK J. NORMAN, Louisiana Employment Law, in LOUISIANA PRACTICE 
SERIES § 14:3 (2017). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 




Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 establishes vicarious liability for 
employers.54 During a vicarious liability analysis, a court determines 
whether an employee was in the course and scope of employment when 
the damage occurred;55 if so, the court may hold the employer vicariously 
liable for the damage that occurred.56 To determine whether an employee 
was in the course and scope of his employment, the court considers 
whether an employee’s conduct is “so closely connected in time, place and 
causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm 
fairly attributable to the employer’s business . . . .”57 If the course-and-
scope requirement is met, the employer is solidarily liable for any 
compensatory damages that the employee may owe to the plaintiff.58 As 
vicarious liability is a type of strict liability, the culpability of the employer 
is irrelevant.59 An employer’s liability is predicated solely on whether an 
employee committed an act within the course and scope of employment.60 
                                                                                                             
 54. Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 provides, in pertinent part: 
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by 
their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which 
they are employed . . . . In the above case[], responsibility only attaches, 
when the masters or employers . . . might have prevented the act which 
caused the damage, and have not done it. 
See also LA. REV. STAT. 9:3921 (2019) (“[E]very master or employer is 
answerable for the damage occasioned by his servant or employee in the exercise 
of the functions in which they are employed.”). 
 55. A court determines whether an employee was in the course and scope of 
employment as follows:  
An employer is liable for the negligence of his employee which is 
committed in the course and scope of his employment. Such negligence 
is in the course and scope of employment if it is so closely connected in 
time, place and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as 
a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared 
with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely 
outside the employer’s business. 
H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, in 18 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE § 16:4 (3d ed. 2017). 
 56. Id. § 14:3. 
 57. Id. § 16:4 (emphasis omitted). 
 58. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) (finding that 
employers and employees are not joint tortfeasors but solidary obligors). When 
multiple obligors are solidarily liable for a single debt, each of the obligors is 
liable for the whole amount of the debt. For a discussion on solidary liability, see 
JOHNSON, III, supra note 55, § 7.41. 
 59. JOHNSON, III, supra note 55, § 14:3. 
 60. See Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d at 328 (finding that vicarious liability is 
imposed upon an employer without regard to the employer’s negligence or fault). 




The relationship between punitive damages and vicarious liability arises 
when an employee causes injury by an act that is proscribed by one of the 
several punitive damages statutes while in the course and scope of his 
employment.61 In the resulting lawsuit, the plaintiff may seek punitive 
damages from the employee as provided by statute, but may also seek to 
recover punitive damages from the employer through vicarious liability.62 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: A GUMBO OF ANALYSES 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, which provides for vicarious liability, 
applies to punitive damages.63 The Court has acknowledged the issue of 
vicarious liability for punitive damages, but it has declined to comment on 
the merits of either side of the argument, expressing “no view on whether 
punitive damages can be imposed against [an employer] who is vicariously 
liable for general damages resulting from the conduct of an [employee].”64 
In the absence of a Louisiana Supreme Court determination, Louisiana 
circuit courts of appeal and federal district courts have reached 
inconsistent results when deciding whether employers are vicariously 
liable for punitive damages.65 
A. The Louisiana Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal 
Two state appellate courts have found employers vicariously liable for 
punitive damages under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4, which 
permits punitive awards when a defendant’s intoxicated driving causes 
damage.66 One such case is Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., decided by the 
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in 1987.67 In Levet, the Fifth 
Circuit assessed whether punitive damages should be imposed on the 
                                                                                                             
 61. See McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 38586 (La. 1932); 
Bourque v. Bailey, 643 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. Ct. App. 1994). See also LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2315.4 (2019); id. art. 2315.7; id. art. 2315.3; LA. REV. STAT. § 15:1312 
(2019); id. § 9:2800.76. 
 62. See, e.g., Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 1000–01 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320. 
 64. Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 718 n.6 (La. 2001) (“We express no 
view on whether punitive damages can be imposed against a party who is 
vicariously liable for general damages resulting from the conduct of an intoxicated 
person, such as an employer.”). 
 65. See supra note 16. 
 66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4. 
 67. Levet v. Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 




employer, but was precluded from directly deciding the issue because the 
employer had stipulated vicarious liability for all damages, including 
punitive damages.68 The Fifth Circuit did observe, however, that the 
employer’s liability was justified because the employer purchased the 
alcohol that the employee consumed on his drive home from work.69 The 
court thus gave credence to using employer’s culpability as a factor when 
deciding whether to impose punitive damages on the employer.70 
In Curtis v. Rome,71 the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal 
found an intoxicated defendant’s employer vicariously liable for punitive 
damages arising from a car crash the employee caused.72 In Curtis, the 
defendant was intoxicated at least in part because he consumed alcohol his 
employer provided, which weighed in favor of the court finding vicarious 
liability for punitive damages.73 Thus, the Fourth Circuit incorporated a 
factual inquiry into its analysis of the culpability of the employer in order 
to determine whether the employer was vicariously liable for punitive 
damages.74  
One year later, the Fourth Circuit in Lacoste v. Crochet held that “an 
intoxicated driver’s employer, when held vicariously liable for damages 
caused by the driver, may be cast for [punitive] damages under article 
2315.4.”75 The members of the Lacoste family were injured in the accident 
and filed suit against Crochet, the tortfeasor, and his employer, Kelley 
Completion Services, to recover compensation for injuries sustained and 
punitive damages because an intoxicated driver-employee caused the 
injuries.76 The trial court held Kelley Completion Services vicariously 
liable for the punitive damages that arose from Crochet’s conduct.77 In 
Lacoste, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling even though 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 158 (“As we view our duty in the present case, it is not to judge, as 
we are urged by the defendants, the philosophical pros and cons of assessing 
exemplary damages against one whose only liability for the injuries sustained is 
vicarious.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (Fourth Circuit 
finding the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages), writ denied sub 
nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748 So. 2d 441 (La. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 826. 
 73. Id. at 824 n.3. 
 74. Id. at 826. 
 75. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998, 100304 (La. Ct. App. 2000).  
 76. Id. Punitive damages are allowed in cases in which an intoxicated driver 
caused the damage. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019).  
 77. Crochet, 751 So. 2d at 1006. 




the employer had no part in the employee’s action.78 Although the 
employee had a previous DWI, the facts of the case do not state if Crochet 
committed the DWI offense while employed for Kelley Completion 
Services.79  
In Lacoste, the employer lacked culpability for the actions of its 
employee, but the court, relying on Curtis, nevertheless found vicarious 
liability for punitive damages.80 The Lacoste analysis is distinguishable 
from the Fourth Circuit’s analyses in Levet and Curtis because in Lacoste, 
the court conducted no factual inquiry into the culpability of the 
employer.81 Instead, the court relied on the precedent set in Curtis and 
found vicarious liability using a strict liability standard.82 
B. The Louisiana Third Circuit and the United States District Courts for 
the Eastern and Western Districts of Louisiana  
Opposite the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, one Louisiana appellate court 
and two federal district courts in Louisiana have not extended vicarious 
liability to punitive damages.83 When the issue of vicarious liability for 
punitive damages came before Louisiana’s Third Circuit, the court took a 
unique approach.84 In Gillespie v. Calcasieu School Board, Steven and 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 1000–01. The court does not relay facts that suggest the employer 
was aware of the employee’s conduct. See id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See id. (finding vicarious liability based upon precedent). But see Levet v. 
Calais & Sons, Inc., 514 So. 2d 153 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (observing the culpability 
of the employer in the specific instance); Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. 
App. 1999) (reasoning that the employer deserved to be held vicariously liable for 
punitive damages because of the specific conduct of the employer). 
 82. Crochet, 751 So. 2d at 100304. 
 83. See Smith v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 95-3004, 1996 WL 537746, at *2 
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1996) (“Considering these general principles, and the lack of 
any relevant Louisiana jurisprudence holding an employer liable under this 
particular statute, [Defendant] is entitled to summary judgment, dismissing the 
claims for exemplary damages as provided in Article 2315.4.”); Lankford v. Nat’l 
Carriers Inc., No. 12-01280, 2015 WL 518736, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015) 
(“Thus, [article 2315.4] does not allow the imposition of punitive damages against 
persons who are vicariously liable such as the employer in this case.”); Phelps v. 
Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 13-6685, 2015 WL 12564180, at *1 (E.D. La. 
2015) (noting that a recent decision “supports the finding that employers may not 
be held vicariously liable under art. 2315.4”); Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 
179 So. 3d 966, 970 (La. Ct. App. 2015), writ denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016). 
 84. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966. 




Leslie Gillespie filed suit on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor 
daughter against a teacher who engaged in sexual conduct with their 
daughter, and against the School Board that employed the teacher.85 The 
suit they filed against the School Board sought both compensatory and 
punitive damages under the theory of vicarious liability.86  
When the minor child was a student at Sam Houston High School, 
teacher Lance Duhon engaged in a sexual relationship with her.87 Duhon 
allegedly sent sexually explicit text messages to the child, soliciting her to 
“meet him in his classroom to engage in improper, illegal and sexual acts 
including, but not limited to, having her perform oral sex on him.”88 The 
teacher’s solicitations and the subsequent acts allegedly occurred on an 
“almost daily basis for a number of months.”89 In addition to compensatory 
damages, the Gillespies sought punitive damages under Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2315.3, which allows punitive damages in cases of child 
pornography.90  
Prior to his employment at Sam Houston High School, Duhon worked 
at Barbe High School in Calcasieu Parish.91 In 2007, the Calcasieu School 
Board launched an investigation into Duhon’s conduct with a student at 
Barbe, resulting in the decision not to renew Duhon’s contract.92 Duhon, 
when applying to work at Sam Houston High School in 2012, disclosed 
the prior investigation for sexual misconduct to the principal of Sam 
Houston.93 The principal of Sam Houston contacted the principal at Barbe, 
who confirmed that the Calcasieu School Board investigated Duhon for 
sexual misconduct with a 15-year-old female student and that “she would 
not rehire him as the result of those incidents.”94 The principal of Barbe, 
concerned about the possibility of Duhon being hired at another school 
within the same school district, called the Head of High Schools for the 
Calcasieu Parish school system to inform him of Duhon’s sexual 
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 87. Id. at 967. 
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 90. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.3 (2019) (“[E]xemplary damages 
may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were 
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the person 
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 91. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 968. 
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 93. Id. at 974 (Cooks, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. 




misconduct.95 Nevertheless, the principal of Sam Houston hired Duhon, 
and the School Superintendent personally approved the hiring decision.96 
Despite the evidence of the School Board’s recklessness and culpable 
behavior in the hiring of Duhon, the Third Circuit found that the Calcasieu 
Parish School Board was not vicariously liable for the punitive damages 
arising out of Duhon’s conduct.97  
In Gillespie,98 the Third Circuit held that the Calcasieu School Board 
was not vicariously liable for its teacher’s sexual misconduct and that 
Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 was completely inapplicable to punitive 
damages—meaning that vicarious liability for punitive damages does not 
exist in Louisiana.99 The Gillespie court reasoned that because vicarious 
liability under article 2320 imposes solidary liability,100 the court should 
interpret the article similarly to article 2324, which imposes solidary 
liability on co-conspirators.101 The court determined that because solidary 
liability under Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 is inapplicable to the 
disposition of punitive damages,102 the solidary liability imposed under 
article 2320 should be inapplicable to punitive damages as well.103 In 
applying its reasoning, however, the Gillespie court did not consider the 
individual culpability of the employer.104  
In Romero v. Clarendon American Insurance, the Third Circuit again 
found no vicarious liability for punitive damages under Civil Code article 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (“Duhon intentionally falsified, under oath, the required statement on 
the sexual misconduct disclosure form required by the School Board. Having 
previously investigated Duhon, the School Board knew the statement was false 
but re-hired Duhon anyway.”). 
 97. Id. at 966 (Amy, J., majority op.).  
 98. Id. at 970; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.7 (2019) (providing that 
punitive damages may be awarded in cases where the damages were caused by 
criminal sexual activity when the victim is seventeen years of age or younger). 
 99. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 970. 
 100. Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) (finding that 
employers and employees are not joint tortfeasors but solidary obligors). When 
multiple obligors are solidarily liable for a single debt, each of the obligors is 
liable for the whole amount of the debt. For a discussion on solidary liability, see 
SAUL LITVINOFF & RONALD J. SCALISE JR., LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, in 5 
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 7.41 (2d ed. 2017). 
 101. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 971. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324 (“He who 
conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is 
answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.”). 
 102. Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 553 (La. 2002).  
 103. Gillespie, 179 So. 3d at 971. 
 104. See id. 




2315.4 for an accident caused by an intoxicated driver.105 The court’s 
analysis, however, was more nuanced than merely finding article 2320 
inapplicable to punitive damages.106 The court held that the employer 
could not be vicariously liable for any punitive damages unless the 
employer contributed to the wrongful conduct.107 Thus, the Third Circuit 
observed that vicarious liability for punitive damages should depend, at 
least partly, on the culpability of the employer.108  
The United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts 
of Louisiana have produced outcomes similar to the Third Circuit, but for 
different reasons.109 In Lankford v. National Carriers Inc., the Western 
District of Louisiana found no vicarious liability for the employer of an 
intoxicated driver because of Louisiana’s strong public policy against 
punitive damages.110 Later in the same year that Lankford was decided, the 
Eastern District of Louisiana decided Phelps v. Daimler Trucks North 
America L.L.C., a case also involving the employer of an intoxicated 
driver.111 The court in Phelps cited Lankford and, using the same 
reasoning, found no vicarious liability for punitive damages.112 The 
reasoning in Lankford and Phelps would not allow vicarious liability for 
                                                                                                             
 105. Romero v. Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d 789 (La. Ct. App. 2010); see 
also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4.  
 106. See Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d 789. But see Gillespie, 179 So. 3d 966. 
 107. Clarendon Am. Ins., 54 So. 3d at 792. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Smith v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 95-30004, 1996 WL 537746, at *2 
(E.D. La. Sept. 20, 1996) (“Considering these general principles, and the lack of 
any relevant Louisiana jurisprudence holding an employer liable under this 
particular statute, [Defendant] is entitled to summary judgment, dismissing the 
claims for exemplary damages as provided in Article 2315.4.”); Lankford v. Nat’l 
Carriers Inc., No. 12-01280, 2015 WL 518736, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 6, 2015) 
(“Thus, [article 2315.4] does not allow the imposition of punitive damages against 
persons who are vicariously liable such as the employer in this case.”); Phelps v. 
Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 13-6695, 2015 WL 12564180, at *1 (E.D. La. 
June 26, 2015) (noting that a recent decision “supports the finding that employers 
may not be held vicariously liable under art. 2315.4”). 
 110. Nat’l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736, at *3 (“Thus, [article 2315.4] does 
not allow the imposition of punitive damages against persons who are vicariously 
liable such as the employer in this case.”). 
 111. See Phelps, 2015 WL 12564180, at *1. 
 112. Id. 




punitive damages in any situation113 because of the traditional disdain that 
civilian jurisdictions have for punitive damages.114  
Because of the lack of relevant legislation addressing whether courts 
may assess punitive damages vicariously,115 the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to rule squarely on the issue,116 the differing interpretations of 
article 2320, the various sources of law that provide avenues for recovery of 
punitive damages,117 and the inclusion of policies for and against punitive 
damages,118 Louisiana courts have rendered inconsistent decisions based 
upon a wide array of reasoning.119 The current circuit split concerning 
whether a court may hold an employer vicariously liable for punitive 
damages has created an ambiguous area of the law.120 
III. LAISSEZ LES BONNES IDÉES ROULER:121 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR 
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The Louisiana Supreme Court could solve the current circuit split 
regarding vicarious liability for punitive damages by rendering a clear 
decision on the matter. When doing so, the Court should adopt a standard 
                                                                                                             
 113. See Nat’l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736. But see Daimler Trucks N. 
Am., LLC, 2015 WL 12564180. 
 114. See deGravelles & deGravelles, supra note 18, at 580 (“The prevailing 
and longstanding rule in modern civil law is that punitive damages violate the 
purpose behind the law of damages, which is to ‘repair the harm sustained by the 
victim of a wrong, and not to punish the wrongdoer.’”). 
 115. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (2019) (making no mention of punitive 
damages); see also, e.g., id. art. 2315.4 (making no mention of vicarious liability).  
 116. Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 718 n.6 (La. 2001) (“We express no 
view on whether punitive damages can be imposed against a party who is 
vicariously liable for general damages resulting from the conduct of an intoxicated 
person, such as an employer.”). 
 117. See supra notes 36–39. 
 118. See, e.g., Nat’l Carriers Inc., 2015 WL 518736; Daimler Trucks N. Am., 
LLC, 2015 WL 12564180. But see Curtis v. Rome, 735 So. 2d 822 (La. Ct. App. 
1999), writ denied sub nom. Rambo v. Rome, 748 So. 2d 441 (La. 1999). 
 119. See supra note 16.  
 120. See Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). But see 
Gillespie v. Calcasieu Par. Sch. Bd., 179 So. 3d 966 (La. Ct. App. 2015), writ 
denied, 187 So. 3d 470 (La. 2016). 
 121. This phrase, translating to “Let the Good Ideas Roll,” is a play on the 
popular Louisiana phrase “laissez les bons temps rouler,” or “let the good times 
roll.” See Bailey Johnson, Laissez les bons temp rouler!: Learn your Mardi Gras 
history, CBS NEWS (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/laissez-les-
bon-temps-rouler-learn-your-mardi-gras-history/ [https://perma.cc/8YKG-FGKY]. 




that all Louisiana courts could apply during a vicarious liability analysis 
for the assessment of punitive damages.  
A. A Strict Liability Standard 
Some jurisdictions in the U.S. use a strict liability approach for 
vicarious liability, holding employers vicariously liable for punitive 
damages regardless of the employer’s culpability.122 The strict liability 
approach is identical to the one courts use to determine vicarious liability 
for compensatory damages.123 The strict liability analysis is permissive of 
the allowance of punitive damages, allowing vicarious liability any time 
the employee commits the wrongful act during the course and scope of 
employment.124 
A strict liability approach to vicarious liability for punitive damages 
punishes an employer for employing an individual.125 Conducting a 
vicarious liability analysis for punitive damages without considering the 
individual culpability of the employer is misguided because the aim of 
punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter bad conduct.126 
                                                                                                             
 122. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 13 (1984). The 
following states use a strict liability standard when assessing vicarious liability for 
punitive damages: Alabama, Avondale Mills v. Bryant, 63 So. 932 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1913); Arizona, Haralson v. Fisher Surveying, Inc., 31 P.3d 114, 115 (Ariz. 2001) 
(en banc); Arkansas, Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 479 S.W.2d 518 (Ark. 1972); 
Georgia, Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc. v. General Warehouse No. 2, 149 S.E.2d 72 
(Ga. 1966); Indiana, Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 
1977); Kentucky, Liberty Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Gruenberger, 477 S.W.2d 503, 
505 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972); Maine, Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (Me. 
1869); Michigan, Lucas v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 56 N.W. 1039 (Mich. 1893); 
Mississippi, Sandifer Oil Co. v. Drew, 71 So. 2d 752 (Miss. 1954); Missouri, 
Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Montana, Rickman v. 
Safeway Stores, 227 P.2d 607 (Mont. 1951); North Carolina, Hairston v. Atlantic 
Greyhound Corp., 18 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. 1942); Oklahoma, Bierman v. Aramark 
Refreshment Servs., Inc., 198 P.3d 877, 879 (Okla. 2008); Oregon, Stroud v. 
Denny’s Restaurant, Inc., 532 P.2d 790 (Or. 1975) (en banc); Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia Traction Co. v. Orbann, 12 A. 816 (Pa. 1888); South Carolina, Hooper 
v. Hulto, 158 S.E. 726 (S.C. 1931); Tennessee, Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526 
(Tenn. 1974).  
 123. NORMAN, supra note 50, § 14:3. 
 124. Id. 
 125. A strict liability analysis has no bearing on culpability. See, e.g., Sampay 
v. Morton Salt Co., 395 So. 2d 326 (La. 1981) (finding that vicarious liability is 
imposed upon an employer without regard to the employer’s negligence or fault). 
 126. KEETON, supra note 122, at 9. 




Holding an employer vicariously liable regardless of culpability does not 
punish the wrongdoer, but rather the employer of the wrongdoer solely 
because of his employment.127 Most actions in employment scenarios that 
result in punitive damages stem from an employee’s personal decision, 
which usually is not in furtherance of the employer’s interest.128 A court 
should not hold an employer responsible for the punitive damages arising 
from strictly personal decisions that an employee makes, especially when 
a court will hold the employer vicariously liable for compensatory 
damages of the plaintiff.129  
A strict liability approach, however, would force employers to “exercise 
closer control” over employees, which would ideally result in more 
responsible employees.130 Although a strict liability standard would 
incentivize employers to carefully select employees based upon character, it 
loosens the control that employers have over potential liability employees 
cause.131 Under a strict liability standard, if an employee commits an act 
within the course and scope of employment, the employer has no way to avoid 
liability, no matter the employee’s motivation or the employer’s culpability 
for the action.132 As a result of the employer’s blanket liability under the strict 
liability approach, punitive damage awards are no longer consistent with the 
penal purpose of punishing the culpable party.133 Additionally, such 
punishment may have negative economic repercussions.134 For businesses, 
especially corporations, large punitive awards can translate to financial harm 
for companies and shareholders.135 Although punitive damages are insurable 
                                                                                                             
 127. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 84 (1881) (“[T]he party 
whose voluntary conduct has caused the damage should suffer, rather than one 
who has had no share in producing it.”). 
 128. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019) (punishing defendants who 
make the personal decision to drive while intoxicated and ultimately cause injury 
to another).  
 129. KEETON, supra note 122, at 9. 
 130. Id. at 13.  
 131. Under a strict liability standard, an employer would be vicariously liable 
for punitive damages in every single instance that the employee causes damages. 
Language in Louisiana Civil Code article 2320 places liability on the employer only 
if he could have prevented the harm, but courts have generally read that language 
out of the article. Moreover, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:3921, which addresses 
vicarious liability and follows Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, makes no mention 
of the “might have prevented” language. NORMAN, supra note 50, § 14:3. 
 132. See generally id.  
 133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 134. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., On the Determinants and 
Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 527 (1999). 
 135. Id. 




when vicariously assessed in Louisiana, they are often subject to exclusion 
clauses in insurance policies.136 As a result, some employers may be left 
with no way to insure against an assessment of punitive damages.137  
B. The Restatement of Torts Solution 
Although some jurisdictions use strict liability to determine vicarious 
liability and give no weight to an employer’s culpability, the majority of 
jurisdictions in the U.S. hold employers vicariously liable for punitive 
damages only if the employer meets specific criteria of culpability.138 The 
Second Restatement of Torts provides the criteria such jurisdictions use.139 
All of the criteria of culpability provided in the Restatement are not 
intended to “apply to the interpretation of special statutes such as those 
giving double damages, as to which no statement is made.”140 The Second 
Restatement of Torts states that a court can properly award punitive 
damages against an employer for damages an employee causes if:  
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and 
                                                                                                             
 136. See, e.g., Taylor v. Lumar, 612 So. 2d 798 (La. Ct. App. 1992). 
 137. Id. 
 138. KEETON, supra note 122, at 12. The following states follow the 
Restatement of Torts when assessing vicarious liability for punitive damages: 
California, White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 952 (Cal. 1999); Colorado, Frick 
v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852 (Colo. 1979); Connecticut, Maisenbacker v. Society 
Concordia of Danbury, 42 A. 67 (Conn. 1899); Florida, Mercury Motors Exp., Inc. 
v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981); Hawaii, Lauer v. YMCA, 557 P.2d 1334 (Haw. 
1976); Idaho, Openshaw v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 929 (Idaho 1971); 
Illinois, Holda v. Kane Cty., 410 N.E.2d 552 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Iowa, Briner v. 
Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858 (Iowa 1983); Kansas, Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 990 
(Kan. 1993); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(2) (West Supp. 2018); 
Nevada, Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 607 P.2d 569 (Nev. 1980); New Jersey, 
Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v. Lehman Assoc. Inc., 260 A.2d 248 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); New Mexico, Robertson v. Carmel Builders Real 
Estate, 92 P.3d 653, 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003); New York, Craven v. Bloomingdale, 
64 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1902); North Dakota, John Deere Co. v. Nygard Equip., Inc., 
225 N.W.2d 80 (N.D. 1974); Ohio, Tracy v. Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co., 
152 N.E. 641 (Ohio 1926); Rhode Island, Conti v. Winters, 136 A.2d 622 (R.I. 
1957); Texas, Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967); 
Vermont, Shortle v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 399 A.2d 517 (Vt. 1979); Virginia, 
Freeman v. Sproles, 131 S.E.2d 410 (Va. 1963); West Virginia, Addair v. Huffmann, 
195 S.E.2d 739 (W. Va. 1973); Wisconsin, Garcia v. Sampson’s, Inc., 103 N.W.2d 
565 (Wis. 1960); Wyoming, Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
 140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 




the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal 
or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, 
or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was 
acting in the scope of employment, or (d) the principal or a 
managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.141  
A court must individually examine the four criteria of culpability provided 
in the Restatement to assess the functionality and fairness of each.  
Part (a) of the Restatement provides that a court can hold employers 
that explicitly authorize the “doing and the manner of the act” vicariously 
liable for punitive damages.142 For example, in Denver & R G R Co. v. 
Harris, a railroad company directed its employees to launch an assault on 
the property of a competing railroad company.143 As a result of the 
employer’s direct authorization of the wrongful act, the court held the 
employer vicariously liable for punitive damages.144 Part (a) of the 
Restatement is the most functionally sound and fair of all of the factors 
because an employer that authorizes an act is the most culpable party for 
the act other than the actor himself.145  
Under the criteria of part (b) of the Restatement, an employer can be 
vicariously liable for punitive damages if he knowingly employs or retains 
an employee that possesses a character trait causing the injury that gave 
rise to the punitive damages.146 The Restatement uses the term 
“characteristic,”147 in explaining the criterion. In application, however, the 
criterion is based upon past conduct rather than a true character trait.148 
The case Cates v. Darland illustrates the “characteristic” criterion, a case 
in which an unhappy customer sued a car dealership because of an 
employee misrepresenting the mileage on a vehicle by turning back the 
odometer.149 The same employee had previously engaged in the same 
                                                                                                             
 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909.  
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. Denver & R G R Co v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 605–07 (1887). 
 144. Id. at 610. 
 145. See, e.g., id. at 605–07 (finding a railroad company employer vicariously 
liable for punitive damages for directing its employees to storm the property of a 
competing railroad company).  
 146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909. 
 147. Id. § 909 cmt. b. 
 148. See, e.g., Cates v. Darland, 537 P.2d 336 (Okla. 1975) (finding a car 
salesman employee’s past conduct of turning back odometers a characteristic that, 
when known by the employer, allowed the employer to be held vicariously liable 
for the punitive damages arising from that characteristic). 
 149. Id. at 337. 




conduct by turning back the odometer on other vehicles.150 The court in 
Cates found the employer was aware of the employee’s previous conduct 
and thus held the employer vicariously liable for punitive damages.151 A 
“characteristic”152 under part (b) of the Restatement is therefore not 
necessarily a character trait, but rather a specific instance of previous 
conduct similar to the conduct giving rise to the award of punitive 
damages.153  
The most straightforward application of this criterion to Louisiana law 
is demonstrated in the following hypothetical:  
An employer hires or retains an employee who the employer 
knows to be a recovering alcoholic. If, during a work errand, that 
employee caused damage to another while driving under the 
influence of alcohol, Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 would 
allow recovery of punitive damages.154  
Under the criterion of culpability part (b) of the Restatement outlines, 
the employer in the above hypothetical would be vicariously liable for 
punitive damages resulting from injury the employee caused while driving 
intoxicated.155  
Although the criteria in part (b) encourages employers to be especially 
diligent in hiring employees, it de-incentivizes employers from employing 
persons suffering from alcoholism, drug addiction, and other physical and 
mental issues.156 Moreover, an employee would become seemingly “unfit” 
for retention if convicted of a DWI.157 Under the criteria in part (b), 
employers that seek complete insulation for liability would be forced to 
deem whole groups of people unemployable, creating unnecessary 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. at 33738. 
 151. Id. at 336. 
 152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 cmt. b. 
 153. Darland, 537 P.2d at 336. 
 154. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.4 (2019). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909. See also Kurn v. Radencic, 141 
P.2d 580, 582 (1943) (holding that an employer was vicariously liable for punitive 
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 156. A broad application of part (b) would likely hold an employer vicariously 
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intoxicated. Consequently, the employer, to limit liability, would likely avoid 
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 157. Darland, 537 P.2d 336. 




financial burdens on the state.158 Some jurisdictions follow part (b) of the 
Restatement to force employers to “exercise closer control” over their 
employees.159 Because the approach in part (b) incentivizes employers to 
select employees carefully and based upon past conduct,160 it would be 
difficult for employers to assess with a great degree of accuracy whether 
a potential employee would later cause an injury allowing an award of 
punitive damages, as past conduct is not necessarily indicative of future 
behavior.161 If a court were to include part (b) of the Restatement in a 
vicarious liability analysis, the court should consider the specific facts of 
the case to determine the employer’s culpability rather than broadly apply 
part (b).  
If an employee acting in a managerial capacity commits an act that 
gives rise to punitive damages, his employer would be vicariously liable 
under part (c) of the Restatement.162 An employer’s culpability differs, 
however, when a low-level manager commits a bad act versus a senior 
executive.163 A court would understandably hold a company vicariously 
liable for the acts of a high-level executive, but not necessarily a local 
assistant manager, because the former speaks and acts for the company in 
                                                                                                             
 158. Employers often consider potential liability when deciding whether or not 
to hire employees. See Kenneth I. Sondik, Ban the Box Leaves Employers Liable 
for Negligent-Hiring Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes 
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 159. KEETON, supra note 122, at 13. 
 160. Darland, 537 P.2d 336. 
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 162. The Restatement provides the following as an illustration of this criterion 
of culpability:  
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manager to supervise the management of the units. While visiting a unit 
B discovers facts that lead him to believe erroneously that one of the 
clerks has been stealing. He directs the local manager to imprison the 
clerk. In the ensuing interview, he permits the local manager to use 
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corporation, punitive damages can properly be awarded. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 163. White v. Ultramar, Inc., 981 P.2d 944, 952 (1999). 




a way that the latter cannot.164 In White v. Ultramar, the Supreme Court of 
California addressed the issue of whether a lower-level managerial 
employee should qualify as a managerial employee for the purposes of part 
(c) of the Restatement.165 The White court reasoned, “A rule defining 
managing agent as any supervisor who can hire or fire employees, but who 
does not have substantial authority over decisions that ultimately determine 
corporate policy, effectively allows punitive damage liability without proof 
of anything more than simple tort liability, which we have long recognized 
is insufficient.”166 As the court in White observed, holding an employer 
vicariously liable for punitive damages for the actions of any employee in 
any managerial capacity would create far too broad a standard.167 
Like part (b), part (c) of the Restatement incentivizes employers to 
avoid retaining or hiring unfit employees.168 The criterion provided in part 
(c) uses fear of potential punitive damage liability to incentivize employers 
to exercise higher levels of caution and care when hiring managers and 
promoting employees to managerial status.169 Nevertheless, part (c) 
imposes an even higher burden on employers for evaluating candidates for 
managerial positions, no matter what level of authority the managerial 
position may involve.170 Employers, however, likely would not spend the 
same amount of time, effort, and resources evaluating the character and 
background of a candidate for a position as a local assistant manager as 
they would for a position as the chief financial officer of a company.171  
Part (d) of the Restatement is the last consideration under the Restatement 
approach, providing that courts may hold employers vicariously liable for 
punitive damages in situations in which the employer ratifies or expresses 
approval for the act that gave rise to the punitive damages.172 “Expresses 
approval” is analogous to the retroactive “authorization” part (a) of the 
Restatement explains.173 As in part (a), this criterion serves the purpose of 
punitive damages: to punish and deter bad conduct.174 Upon ratification, the 
one ratifying is subject to tort liability to the person the purported agent 
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harmed.175 An overt act expressing approval or affirmation of the 
employee’s act would typically perfect ratification;176 however, silence may 
constitute ratification.177 The Restatement goes on to explain that merely 
failing to dismiss an employee does not amount to ratification of the bad 
act.178 Nevertheless, the Restatement does not consider whether failing to 
reprimand an employee or express disapproval for a bad act is considered 
ratification through inaction.179 Because the criteria of ratification aligns 
with the aim of punitive damages and does not extend vicarious liability for 
punitive damages to employers without culpability, courts should use the 
criteria in every vicarious liability analysis for punitive damages. With 
respect to a question of ratification by silence or inaction during a vicarious 
liability analysis, the court should have the discretion to make such a 
judgment.  
C. No Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages 
Although a hardline rule precluding vicarious liability for punitive 
damages truly embraces the restrictive civilian view on punitive damages, 
it allows employers like the Calcasieu Parish School Board to avoid all 
instances of vicarious liability for punitive damages, even in situations in 
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which the employer was overtly complicit in the wrongdoing.180 If 
Louisiana wishes to embrace a true civilian approach to punitive damages, 
it should repeal all statutes that provide for recovery of punitive damages 
rather than merely restrict plaintiffs’ recovery through vicarious 
liability.181 If the aim of punitive damages is to punish wrongdoers and 
deter bad behavior,182 and Louisiana intends to allow plaintiffs to pursue 
punitive damages under certain statutes, then Louisiana should adopt an 
approach that allows courts to assess punitive damages against employers 
through vicarious liability when employers are especially culpable for the 
injury that gave rise to the punitive damages. Although the strict liability 
standard applies to employer liability for compensatory damages,183 
vicarious liability for punitive damages should involve a more nuanced 
approach.  
IV. LOUISIANA’S SOLUTION: A NOVEL, TWO-STEP BASELINE TEST 
The ideal test for punitive damages in a vicarious liability analysis 
would completely ignore any notion of strict liability. Instead, the test 
would incorporate all of the criteria from the Restatement of Torts, but not 
use the criteria in their broadest application as an automatic trigger for 
vicarious liability.184 Using this novel test, a court would conduct the 
vicarious liability analysis for punitive damages in two separate steps.  
In the first step, the four criteria from the Restatement would act as a 
baseline for a vicarious liability analysis.185 If an employer meets any of 
the criteria, then the employer would meet the baseline. Once an employer 
meets the baseline—the minimum threshold of culpability—then the court 
could proceed to the second step to determine the employer’s individual 
fault and whether vicarious liability for punitive damages is warranted in 
that particular case. 
The second step would determine whether vicarious liability is 
applicable based upon how culpable the employer was in the specific 
instance that caused the plaintiff harm. The court would conduct this inquiry 
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on a case-by-case basis, applying the specific facts of the case to determine 
how culpable the employer was based upon the employer’s acts or 
omissions. Courts would conduct the second step using their discretion in 
determining whether or not the employer’s acts or omissions contributed to 
the plaintiff’s injuries such that the employer’s culpability warrants an 
assessment of vicarious punitive damages.  
This two-step solution would not prevent plaintiffs from becoming 
whole because punitive damages are a “supra-compensatory remedy,”186 
and courts award them not in place of, but in addition to any award of 
compensatory damages.187 Similar to the Restatement’s criteria, which do 
not apply to double or treble damage statutes,188 the solution should not 
apply to instances of liability arising from double or treble damage 
statutes,189 which are not “supra-compensatory” in nature.190 Although the 
baseline test will restrict vicarious liability for punitive damages, such a 
restriction will not decrease or eliminate a plaintiff’s ability to be fully 
compensated for his injury through compensatory damages.191 Perhaps 
most importantly, this solution would serve the purpose of punitive 
damages—to punish and deter—since only the most culpable employers 
would be vicariously liable for punitive damages.192 
A. Using the Restatement Criteria as a Baseline Test  
Under part (a) of the Restatement, courts would hold employers 
vicariously liable for punitive damages when employers explicitly 
authorized the doing and the manner of the employee’s act.193 For 
example, an application of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 would 
resemble the following: An employer hosts a work event that involves 
alcohol for employees’ consumption. After the work event, the employer 
instructs the employee to complete a work-related errand that involves 
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vehicular travel.194 The employer, knowing that the employee has 
consumed alcohol, has explicitly authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act. If in this scenario the employee causes injury to another as a result 
of his driving while intoxicated, this criterion would allow the employer 
to be held vicariously liable for any resulting punitive damages.195 As the 
behavior outlined in part (a) of the Restatement is the express authorization 
of the doing and the manner of the bad act, it is likely that a court would 
find the employer culpable enough to be held vicariously liable for 
punitive damages whenever the baseline test for part (a) is satisfied.196  
Part (b) of the Restatement would allow a court to hold an employer 
vicariously liable for punitive damages if he knowingly employed or 
retained an employee who possessed a character trait that caused the injury 
giving rise to the punitive damages.197 Part (b) in its broadest application 
would allow a court to hold an employer vicariously liable if the employee 
had a history of behavior similar to the behavior that caused the damage.198 
Using the criterion as a baseline for a vicarious liability analysis, a court, 
finding that an employer met the requirements of part (b), should further 
make a determination of the culpability of the employer.199 Such a case-
by-case determination would allow courts to hold culpable employers 
liable for punitive damages but protect employers who did not commit 
wrong acts.  
Part (c) would allow a court to hold an employer vicariously liable for 
punitive damages in situations in which the employee who caused the 
injury was in a managerial capacity.200 Again, using a baseline test, when 
the employee was in a managerial capacity, a court would proceed with a 
determination of the employer’s culpability. A court should consider the 
level of authority a supervisor or managerial employee possessed, 
allowing a better determination of whether the employee’s status allowed 
him to act as the employer.201 Just as the court in White observed, the mere 
presence of a person in holding any managerial capacity does not itself 
justify holding an employer vicariously liable for the individual’s 
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actions.202 Using the baseline test, a court should distinguish between the 
culpability of an employer when the employee was a low-level manager 
and when the employee was a senior executive. 
Part (d) of the Restatement would allow a court to hold employers 
vicariously liable for punitive damages when the employer ratifies or 
expresses approval for the act.203 It is unlikely that in a scenario similar to 
the DWI hypothetical, the employer would express approval for the acts 
of the employee; however, if an employer ratifies or expresses approval 
for a bad act, it is appropriate for the employer to be vicariously liable for 
punitive damages.204 As the behavior outlined in part (d) is the ratification 
or approval of the bad act, a court would likely find the employer culpable 
enough to be held vicariously liable for punitive damages whenever the 
baseline test for part (d) is satisfied.205 
The baseline test would allow employers to be punished for bad 
conduct, such as authorizing or ratifying an employee’s bad act, and overly 
reckless behavior, such as retaining an employee who has been convicted 
of several DWI offenses since beginning employment in a position that 
involves vehicular travel. It would not allow, however, vicarious liability 
for punitive damages to extend to employers who are not culpable in some 
way for the bad act. Using the Restatement criteria as a baseline for a 
vicarious liability analysis would significantly restrict vicarious liability 
for punitive damages, and employers could more easily limit liability for 
punitive damages through protective measures.206  
B. Application of the Two-Step Baseline Test to Lacoste v. Crochet 
The court in Lacoste found the employer, Kelley, vicariously liable 
for the intoxicated truck driver, Crochet, whose actions gave rise to 
punitive damages.207 Under the proposed baseline test, the outcome of 
Lacoste would depend on certain facts not clearly explained in the court’s 
opinion.208 Crochet was previously convicted of a DWI.209 It is unclear, 
however, whether Kelley knew of the previous conviction, and if so, when 
it took place.210 If Kelley knew of Crochet’s previous DWI, then that 
                                                                                                             
 202. Id. 
 203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909. 
 204. See generally id. 
 205. See generally id. 
 206. See generally id. 
 207. Lacoste v. Crochet, 751 So. 2d 998 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 208. See supra Introduction. 
 209. Crochet, 751 So. 2d at 100001. 
 210. Id. 




would satisfy the criterion in part (b) and the baseline of step one.211 The 
court would proceed to step two and conduct a fact-based consideration to 
determine Kelley’s culpability based upon its acts or omissions. The court 
could consider factors such as whether Kelley ensured that Crochet 
received court-ordered or volunteer counseling as a result of the DWI, or 
whether Kelley administered alcohol tests to Crochet as a result of the 
previous offense. Taking factors such as these into consideration, the court, 
in its discretion, could determine the level of culpability that Kelley had in 
Crochet’s acts, and whether, if at all, Kelley’s culpability contributed to the 
plaintiff’s injuries warranting vicarious liability for punitive damages.  
C. Application of the Two-Step Baseline Test to Gillespie v. Calcasieu 
School Board 
In Gillespie, the court found that the Calcasieu School Board was not 
vicariously liable for punitive damages.212 Using the baseline test, the 
court likely would have held the Calcasieu School Board vicariously liable 
for punitive damages. The Calcasieu School Board’s awareness of 
Duhon’s previous sexual misconduct with a student would satisfy the 
criterion set forth in part (b) of the Restatement and meet the baseline of 
step one.213 The court would then proceed to step two and use its discretion 
when considering the School Board’s acts or omissions to determine the 
School Board’s culpability.214 Given the School Board’s knowledge of 
Duhon’s previous activity,215 and the School Board’s disregard of the 
opinion of Duhon’s former principal,216 a court using the baseline test 
would likely determine that the School Board’s culpability contributed to 
the plaintiff’s injuries and hold the School Board vicariously liable for the 
punitive damages arising from Duhon’s conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Tort law in Louisiana is one of the most complex parts of Louisiana’s 
mixed legal system.217 Use of the two-step baseline test proposed in Part 
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IV would embrace this mixed law system by allowing courts to remain 
mindful of the civil law’s restrictive nature on punitive damages but still 
provide a balanced version of the criteria of the Restatement, a common 
law standard.218 Adopting the baseline test modeled on the Restatement of 
Torts would provide Louisiana courts with a streamlined test courts could 
use during vicarious liability analyses for punitive damages.219 This 
solution would resolve the current contradicting circuit precedent and 
generally restrict the availability of punitive damages through vicarious 
liability, adhering to Louisiana’s civilian heritage and providing an avenue 
of recovery when employers were complicit in or considerably culpable 
for the wrongful conduct.  
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